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Introduction 
 
Ever since the execution of the heroic Song Dynasty general Yue Fei by the “archetypical 
traitor” Qin Hui, the epithet hanjian has persisted as one of the most damning in the Chinese 
language.1 Almost a thousand years later, hanjian remains a particularly vitriolic part of Chinese 
political discourse. In 1995-1996, in response to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s apparent 
movement toward Taiwanese independence and formal American diplomatic recognition, the 
People’s Liberation Army bracketed the island with nuclear-capable missiles on two separate 
occasions.2 As the culminating point of a slew of insults, Beijing condemned Lee’s father as a 
hanjian for having served in the Japanese colonial police.3 In 2008, the historian Yan Chongnian 
was publicly slapped and called a hanjian at a book signing for his new study of the Kangxi 
Emperor, while billionaire Fan Jianchuan announced he would open a museum dedicated to 
hanjian in order to highlight the nuances of a term that is all too frequently “hurled at anyone 
who disagrees with a speaker on sensitive issues, particularly those involving history or race.”4 
The term itself consists of the Han ethonym 汉 and the word奸 or姦 (jian), meaning 
“treason,” “fornication,” or “adultery.” The Hanyu dacidian, the definitive dictionary of the 
Chinese language, states that hanjian “originally indicated the scum of the Han people. Later it 
                                                 
1
 Yingjie Guo and Baogang He, “Reimagining the Chinese Nation: The ‘Zeng Guofan Phenomenon,’” Modern 
China 25, no. 2 (April 1999), p. 152; Xinhua News Agency, “Archeologists to Excavation of [sic] Possible Tomb of 
Qin Hui,” China.org.cn, December 27, 2006, accessed April 11, 2012, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/194112.htm 
2
 Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), pp. 255-257. 
3
 The Chinese government also described Lee as “the scum of the nation” who belonged to “the rubbish bin of 
history.” Mark O’Neill, “The Dilemma Facing Beijing,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 17, 1999, 
accessed Oct 17, 2011. http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-
2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:CMP1&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=133B5B
2BCC68A6A8&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggregated5&req_dat=0D0CB4F084AAC1B5 
4
 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Truth and Reconciliation.” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 30, 2008, 
accessed Oct 17, 2011, http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-
2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:CMP1&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=13272E
1E733C8420&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggdocs&req_dat=0D0CB4F084AAC1B5 
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came to refer to someone who seeks refuge with a foreign race or a foreign invader, willingly 
follows their orders, and sells out the interests of his own nation and race.”5 The Taiwanese 
Zhongwen dacidian defines hanjian more concisely, as “the term for one who willingly sells out 
his own country for the benefit of foreigners.”6 In his article “Hanjian! (Traitor!) Collaboration 
and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai,” China scholar Frederic Wakeman, Jr. states that the word 
also connotes feelings of betrayal, spiritual chaos, and sexual transgression.7 
However, neither these definitions nor the Hanyu dacidian’s brief list of historical 
references serves to explain the wide variety of figures branded as hanjian. Throughout China’s 
dynastic history, hanjian described imperial officials who had betrayed their respective rulers 
like Qin Hui as well as ordinary Han who abandoned Chinese civilization. Over the past two 
centuries, the phrase’s frequency and virulence have both multiplied. China’s violent clashes 
with foreign imperialism and the chaos of her forced march to modernity have left a teeming host 
of compradors, turncoats, officials, and collaborators all marked with the stigma of hanjianism. 
In the twenty-first century, the term has lost much of its original meaning and has become a 
catchall slur for one’s political opponents, particularly online. In a 2011 post titled “In Today’s 
China, Who Isn’t a Hanjian?” Chinese blogger Wang Jinsi remarks that the term has recently 
become so prolific that “non-hanjian are even rarer than wild Manchurian tigers.”8 
                                                 
5
 “原指汉族的败类。后泛指投靠外族或外国侵略者，甘心首期驱使，出卖祖国民族利益的人。” Luo 
Zhufeng, ed., Hanyu dacidian (Shanghai: Hanyu dacidian chubanshe, 1988), vol. 6, p. 49, col. B. Translation mine. 
6
 “谓为外人之利益而甘心为害本国之人也。” Zhang Qiyun, ed., Zhongwen dacidian (Taibei: Zhonghua 
xueshuyuan, 1982), p. 8463. Translation mine. 
7
 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “Hanjian (Traitor)! Collaboration and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai,” in Wen-hsin Yeh, 
ed., Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond (Ewing, NJ: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 
298-299.  Following Wakeman’s analysis, perhaps “Hanfucker” would be a more accurate English rendering of the 
term in its pejorative context. 
8
 “‘非汉奸’已经比野生东北虎还稀罕.” Wang Jinsi, “Dangjin Zhongguo shei bu shi hanjian?” (“In Today’s China, 
Who Isn’t a Hanjian?”), Fenghuang boke (Phoenix Blog), posted December 2, 2011, accessed March 29, 2012, 
http://news.backchina.com/printnews.php?tid=170327&c_lang=gb2312. 
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Nevertheless, it is impossible to understand hanjian’s contemporary meaning, no matter 
how diluted, without a proper understanding of the word’s history. A number of scholarly works 
have offered in-depth examinations of hanjian within a variety of narrow timeframes, 
particularly the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Many of those works serve as 
foundational sources for this paper. However, as of yet there has been no overarching study of 
the term in English.9 Frederic Wakeman’s aforementioned article on wartime hanjian opens with 
a brief overview of the term’s etymology and Qing-era usage, but this information is provided as 
an ideological backdrop for the term’s role in the underground warfare of occupied Shanghai and, 
understandably given the focus of his article, his analysis ends with the war period.10 
This paper attempts to fill this lacuna by providing an overarching summary of the term 
hanjian’s development from the late Qing period to the present. The sheer number of Chinese 
who have been accused as hanjian can only be understood in the context of the strife that has 
plagued China for most of the past two centuries.11 Moreover, although the term has been 
employed in pursuit of concrete political aims, and often without conscious consideration of its 
etymological or historical background, its changing meaning reflects larger questions about how 
to define the national community, the responsibilities of the individual toward the state, and, 
ultimately, what it means to be “Chinese.” By providing the historical and ideological context of 
                                                 
9
 The French website Sinopolis provides a thorough and scholarly French-language assessment by David Serfass of 
hanjian from its origins through the postwar collaboration trials. Serfass cites a number of broad-scope Chinese 
sources, notably Wang Ke, “Hanjian : Xiangxiang zhong de danyi minzu guojia huayu ” (Hanjian: Discourse on an 
Imaginary Homogenous Nation-State) , Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-First Century), No. 83, June 2004 and Li Ling 
“Hanjian fashengxue (Study of the Origins of the Term Hanjian),” Dushu (Reading), Oct 1995. See David Serfass, 
“Hanjian 漢奸: définir la Chine à travers ses traîtres,” Sinopolis : le politique en Chine, July 24, 2010, accessed 
March 29, 2012, http://sinopolis.hypotheses.org/172. 
10
 See Wakeman, “Hanjian!,” pp. 298-301. 
11
 During the First Opium War, one official in Zhejiang province reported that “half of the population were hanjian,” 
while Fan Jianchuan estimates the number of collaborators during the war with Japan at as high as two million. See 
Tatlow, “Truth and Reconciliation,” and Lawrence Wang-chi Wong, “Translators and Interpreters During the 
Opium War between Britain and China (1839-1842), in Myriam Salama-Carr, ed., Approaches to Translation 
Studies, Volume 28: Translating and Interpreting Conflict (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), p. 53. 
Stephen Hurley 
4 
 
these judgments, I hope to dust off the motley categories of hanjian, examining the fabric of each 
piece to show when and why it was cast on the ground to be trampled underfoot. 
American historian Benjamin Azkin has described the literature on nationalism as a 
“terminological jungle.”12 This is particularly true of the Chinese case, as the Chinese conceptual 
vocabulary does not always align seamlessly with the English one, and doubly so during the late 
Qing period, when early nationalists developed their novel formulations of nation and race with 
words calqued from Western thinkers, often by way of Japanese translation. Before casting the 
reader into this unknown world, I hope to clear it of a few vines by defining my own terms. 
Following noted China scholar James Townsend, I take an “ethnicist” view of Chinese 
nationalism, in which the nation (民族 minzu) is defined as “a large, politicized ethnic group 
defined by common culture and alleged descent,” and ethnicity is defined by similar shared 
factors of culture and blood.13 However, Chinese nationalism’s many changes over the past 
century complicate this assessment. Since the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, the 
common Chinese term for the Chinese nation, Zhonghua minzu (中华民族) has carried the 
special meaning of a united nation that is nevertheless composed of multiple distinct ethnicities, 
which are each characterized as minzu (民族). In this paper, I will use the English phrase 
“Chinese nation” and variations when discussing the broader concept of an ethnically constituted 
Chinese community and Zhonghua minzu when explicitly referencing this specific formulation. I 
have striven for consistency, but the terminology will necessary vary when discussing different 
Chinese thinkers’ individual views. 
                                                 
12
 Benjamin Azkin, State and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1964), pp 7-10. Cited in James Townsend, “Chapter One: 
Chinese Nationalism,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism (New York: Sharpe, 1996), p. 6. 
13
 Townsend, “Chapter One,” p. 7. 
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Given the hanjian category’s close ties with the nature of the Chinese nation, it is apt that 
the first major shift in its meaning occurred during the waning days of the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1912), when the Chinese “nation” was born. My first chapter traces the development of Chinese 
nationhood as the reformers and revolutionaries of the late Qing era, drawing upon Western 
ideas of racial struggle and republican sovereignty, sought to define China as a modern nation-
state. 
As China began to be defined as ethnically (or in some cases racially) homogeneous and 
exclusively Han, the term hanjian took on a new meaning. While imperial scholar officials 
continued to use the term to describe those Chinese who rebelled against the central government, 
revolutionary nationalists applied the term to the imperial scholar-officials themselves, as they 
had “sold out the interests of their own nation and race” by serving the Manchu invaders. At the 
same time, the birth of the Chinese nation-state meant that its individual members were recast as 
modern citizens rather than imperial subjects, a new and complex role whose responsibilities 
would have lasting repercussions on the category of hanjian. 
In the second chapter, I examine the issue of hanjian during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War. The physical and temporal extent of the Japanese occupation led thousands of Nationalist 
Party (GMD) officials, local elites, and ordinary Chinese to collude with the Japanese army, 
either to protect themselves and their families or in the name of preserving China itself. After the 
war, the Nationalist government launched an expansive judicial campaign to punish wartime 
collaborators as hanjian. As collaboration specialist Margherita Zanasi has argued, the role of 
these trials was not merely retributive; instead, the GMD hoped the trials would delegitimize 
both the justifications of such prominent collaborators such as Chen Gongbo, the president of the 
Japanese puppet government in Nanjing at the conclusion of the war, and the national narratives 
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their explanations entailed. In emphasizing resistance as the only true path to national loyalty, 
Chiang Kai-shek sought to strengthen his image as a defender against Japanese aggression and 
refute Communist accusations that he had failed to prevent the Japanese invasion. However, the 
GMD’s extension of hanjian status to Taiwanese collaborators, many of whom were not Han and 
all of whom had experienced the war as Japanese subjects, also raises questions about its 
political applicability and lingering ethnic connotations. 
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) record of stalwart wartime resistance played a 
key role in legitimizing their quest for power and ultimately contributed to their victory in the 
Chinese Civil War in 1949. In my third chapter, I address the role of hanjian from the founding 
of the People’s Republic to the present as the Chinese national community has continued to 
transform under the socialist state. During the Mao era (1949-1976), the hanjian label was 
extended to class enemies and traitors to communism, reflecting not only an attempt to demonize 
the Party’s opponents through association with wartime quislings but also the development of a 
new cosmopolitan and revolutionary national body. 
After Mao’s death, China has gradually abandoned the idea of a revolutionary 
community, instead promoting a multiethnic national vision similar to Sun Yat-sen’s original 
conception of a republic of the Zhonghua minzu. In this light, Chinese historians have begun to 
reconsider the status of figures traditionally characterized as hanjian, particularly those inherited 
from the anti-Qing revolutionaries. At the same time as this attempt at professional precision, the 
growth of mass media, and especially the internet, have broadened hanjian’s scope to 
unprecedented levels, severing its popular use almost completely from its etymological and 
historical roots. Nevertheless, as the Yan Chongnian slapping incident reveals, while the term’s 
Stephen Hurley 
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ethnic origin remains peripheral, it still holds the potential to cause problems in a China that is 
nominally cosmopolitan but de facto dominated by the Han majority. 
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Chapter 1 
Waking the Sleeping Lion: Hanjian and the Birth of Chinese Nationalism 
 
The end of the Qing dynasty and founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912 marked a 
major shift in the meaning of the term hanjian as the center of national loyalty shifted from the 
person of the emperor to a more nebulous idea of the nation as a homogenous ethnic community. 
Until the late nineteenth century, hanjian were defined by their opposition to the ruling dynasty. 
The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) applied the parallel term jianmin (奸民“traitorous people”) to 
“corrupt or otherwise discredited officials and to Ming subjects in league with the Japanese and 
other pirates.”14 After the Manchu invasion that ultimately led to the dynasty’s collapse in 1644, 
Ming loyalists used hanjian to designate those officials who had sided with the invaders,15 
paralleling arch-traitor Qin Hui’s role in undermining the Southern Song’s military resistance to 
the invading Jurchen Jin state.16 
Once in power, the Qing adopted many trappings of Chinese civilization in order to 
reassure the Chinese majority and consolidate their control. Although ethnically Manchu, their 
attempts at cultural assimilation extended to the hanjian category. Qing officials used “hanjian” 
to describe ethnic Han in the southern provinces who had moved beyond the pale of settlement, 
abandoning civilization to live among the “barbarians,” or who sided with minority rebels 
against the throne.17 In the face of a devastating succession of domestic revolts,18 these 
                                                 
14
 Donald Sutton, “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier in the Eighteenth Century,” in Pamela Kyle Crossley et al., ed.,  
Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Ewing, NJ: University of 
California Press, 2005), p. 221. 
15
 “At the time of the Ming-Qing transition, the greatest traitors in Ming officials’ eyes were hanjian who crossed 
over to the Manchus just before they “entered the pass” and occupied the Central Plains.” Wakeman, “Hanjian!,” p. 
299. 
16
 The Song were supplanted by the ethnically Jurchen Jin Dynasty. In the seventeenth century the Jurchens, 
nomadic tribesman from north of the Great Wall, were renamed the Manchus by Qing founder Hong Taiji, whose 
father Nurhachi had originally named his dynasty the Later Jin in reference to the Jurchen conquest of the Song. 
17
 Sutton, “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier,” p. 193. 
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proclamations sought to reinforce the perception that, as the holders of the Mandate of Heaven 
(天命 Tianming), the Qing rulers embodied the well-being of Han civilization as a whole. At the 
same time, they severed Han rebels from the larger Han community. 
The late Qing period also saw the evolution of hanjian’s most common meaning, that of 
Chinese who sell out their country to a foreign power. Translation scholar Laurence Wong 
describes how Lin Zexu, the Qing official whose attempts to halt the opium trade provoked the 
First Opium War (1839-1842), lamented the role of Chinese traders in promoting foreign 
aggression: 
Foreign traders from various countries come to China to do business, the cargo 
ships enter the harbour, and those foreign traders staying in Guangzhou and 
Macao are all allowed to hire compradors and servants for assistance. This is 
permitted in our laws. But there is a kind of evil-doers who are not employed on a 
business basis. They secretly had contacts and intercourse with the foreigners, 
colluding with them for illicit businesses by ways and means. They are come to 
be known as hanjian in the inner areas.19 
 
After the war, the forced establishment of treaty ports by the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 further 
expanded Chinese merchants’ chances to engage in Western trade. Meanwhile, the increasing 
number of foreign incursions onto Chinese soil throughout the nineteenth century furnished the 
opportunity to profit from selling intelligence or serving as interpreters for foreign soldiers.20 
                                                                                                                                                             
C. Pat Giersch, “‘A Motley Throng:’ Social Change on Southwest China's Early Modern Frontier, 1700-1880,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 68, 86. 
David G. Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-
1873 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005), pp. 51-54. 
18
 In addition to the fourteen-year civil war against the Taiping rebels (1850-1864), nineteenth-century China saw 
major uprisings by the White Lotus sect, the Nian movement, the Muslim Panthay kingdom, the Miao people, and 
Turkic Muslims in the northwest. 
19
 Lin Zexu, Lin Zexuji: Gongdu (Writings of Lin Zexu: Official Letters) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1963), p. 41, as 
cited in Wong, “Translators and Interpreters,” pp. 53-54. For additional information on hanjian during the Opium 
War, see Yen Ching-Hwang, “Ch'ing Changing Images of the Overseas Chinese (1644-1912),” Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1981), pp. 267-272. 
20
 “After the war started, whole new classes of Hanchien [hanjian] arose: those who obtained maps and sea-charts 
for the enemy, who passed on political and military information to them, acted as pilots, worked as craftsmen on 
board foreign warships and so on. Later the expression became a term of abuse for anyone who favoured 
appeasement rather than war to the death, it often being assumed that, if he did so, it must be because he was in the 
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The combination of foreign incursions and domestic strife ultimately culminated in the 
Xinhai Revolution of 1911, which dethroned the Qing and established the Republic of China. As 
with the Ming-Qing transition before it, the advent of a new regime saw a polar shift in the 
meaning of hanjian. Victory over the Qing validated the nationalist claims of Sun Yat-sen’s 
Revolutionary Alliance (同盟会 Tongmenghui).21 The revolutionaries’ anti-Manchu rhetoric had 
renewed the condemnation of disloyal Ming officials such as Hong Chengchou, a leading general 
who swore allegiance to the Qing after he was defeated in battle, and Wu Sangui, the commander 
whose opening of the Shanhai pass (山海关 Shanhaiguan) between Hebei and Manchuria in 
1644 had allowed the Qing to penetrate China proper.22 In addition to these seventeenth-century 
traitors, the revolutionaries extended the hanjian label to more contemporary officials in service 
to the Manchu, such as the prominent Confucian scholar-official and general Zeng Guofan.23 
However, the revolutionaries’ denunciation of imperial officials as hanjian was more 
than an ad hominem attack on their political enemies. It was also the product of a monumental 
shift in the conception of China itself. The Xinhai Revolution marked the end of the millennia-
                                                                                                                                                             
foreigners’ pay.” Arthur Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), p. 
222. 
21
 The successor to Sun’s previous revolutionary effort, the Revive China Society (兴中会 Xingzhonghui, 1894-
1905), the Revolutionary Alliance was founded in Tokyo in 1905 and united the various anti-Qing revolutionary 
groups into a single organization. Its attempts to incite revolution proved repeatedly unsuccessful, and the Xinhai 
Revolution ultimately broke out independently of its members’ efforts (in fact, Sun Yat-sen was in the United States 
at the time), but the Alliance laid the groundwork for the founding of the Nationalist Party in 1912. 
22
 Wu Sangui’s surrender of the Shanhai pass is often regarded as the turning point of the Manchu invasion. After 
the founding of the Qing victory, he was awarded for his service with a fief in southwestern China. In 1673 Wu and 
two other southern warlords attacked the Qing in the Revolt of the Three Feudatories (三藩之乱 Sanfan zhi Luan), 
which was ultimately suppressed by the Kangxi Emperor in 1681. Wakeman, “Hanjian!” p. 299; Angela N. S. Hsi, 
“Wu San-kuei in 1644: A Reappraisal,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Feb., 1975), p. 443. 
23
 Guo and He, “Reimagining the Chinese Nation,” p. 144. One of the most important Qing officials of the 
nineteenth century, Zeng was equally noted for his military acumen and his steadfast commitment to Confucian 
principles. He commanded, financed, and organized the Xiang Army, the most important imperial force during the 
Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864). While personally responsible for the Qing victory, Zeng voluntarily demobilized his 
army after the conclusion of the rebellion. 
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old imperial system and the birth of “China” as a modern national entity. By 1911, the word 
hanjian no longer just described “the scum of the Han race” who shifted loyalties from one 
dynasty to another or engaged in illicit dealings with foreign barbarians. Instead, it explicitly 
indicated Chinese who, through their service to a foreign power, betrayed the entire national 
community, which was locked in a desperate and increasingly existential struggle with the 
West.24 In order to understand this paradigm shift in hanjian’s meaning, it is necessary to go 
back two decades and examine the complex relationship between the squabbling parents of 
modern Chinese nationalism, the Confucian reformers and anti-Manchu revolutionaries. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, China was in a state of unprecedented crisis. Ever 
since the First Opium War, the Western powers had slowly expanded their presence in the 
Middle Kingdom by obtaining political concessions through the use of bald force, while wave 
after wave of domestic strife sapped the Qing court of vital funds, attention, and manpower. The 
combination of peasant revolt and natural disaster traditionally served as the death knell of 
dynasties, but this time it was not only the Qing who faced extinction.25 The failure of the “self-
strengthening” (自强 ziqiang) programs implemented by leading Confucian officials during the 
Tongzhi Restoration of the 1860s26 seemed to portend the fall of the entire imperial system and, 
                                                 
24
 “[Imperial expansion] served as a critical alarm to Chinese intellectuals who were facing the grave danger of their 
country being divided by foreign invaders. Suddenly, the fear of ‘ethnic extermination and national extinction’ 
spread among Chinese intellectuals and the phrase ‘slaves of an exterminated nation’ became a horrible image they 
used to warn one another.” Shen Sung-chiao, “Discourse on Guomin (‘The Citizen’) in Late Qing China, 1895-1911,” 
Inter-Asian Cultural Studies 7, no. 1 (2006), p. 7. 
25
 In addition to the domestic risings listed above, the Qing were also faced with major flooding of both the Yellow 
and Yangzi rivers. 
26
 Prompted by the crises of the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion, liberal Qing statesmen led by Li 
Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan, and Prince Gong implemented a series of reforms throughout the 1860s. Backed by 
dowager empress and imperial regent Cixi, the reformers hoped to modernize China’s industry, infrastructure, and 
military by adopting Western technology within a traditional Chinese framework. They succeeded in establishing 
the Jiangnan Arsenal, the Interpreters’ College (同文馆 Tongwenguan), and the Office for General Management (总
理衙门 Zongli Yamen), a preliminary foreign policy organ, but in 1870 a massacre of French and Chinese Christians 
in Tianjin prompted renewed foreign intervention and put an end to the Tongzhi Restoration. 
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perhaps, of China itself.27 This threat was driven home by the loss of Vietnam to France in 1885 
and the surrender of Korea and Taiwan to Japan a decade later.28 
Two conflicting factions arose to stay China’s descent, each with its own particular balm 
for its ills. Both the reformers, led by Confucian scholar Kang Youwei and his student Liang 
Qichao, and the revolutionaries, led by Hong Kong- and American-educated doctor Sun Yat-sen, 
turned to Western science and philosophy to revitalize China. While the reformers hoped to 
jump-start Chinese civilization’s faltering Confucian heart through an injection of critical self-
examination and nationwide programs of modernization, the revolutionaries believed that it 
would have to be torn out completely, calling for an end to the dynastic tradition and the 
restructuring of China as a democratic republic. Although the revolutionary worldview would 
win out in 1911, it was the dialectical conflict between these two nationalist strands that 
ultimately engendered the modern conceptions of both hanjian and the Chinese nation-state.  
The reform movement began in 1895 in reaction to the humiliating Treaty of 
Shimonoseki with Japan,29 when the Confucian scholar Kang Youwei and over a thousand of his 
supporters submitted a memorandum to the reform-minded Guangxu Emperor (r. 1875-1908) 
calling for “a complete transformation of China’s economic and educational system.”30 Like the 
self-strengtheners before him, Kang Youwei hoped to save China from the Great Powers’ 
                                                 
27
 Maria Hsia Chang, Return of the Dragon: China’s Wounded Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), p. 
57. 
28
 Skirmishes over the increasing French presence in Indochina led to the outbreak of open warfare in 1884. The 
French navy sailed up the Fuzhou River, passing multiple modern artillery batteries unopposed, before handily 
destroying the Chinese fleet and the modern Fuzhou Navy Yard. This defeat shattered the Qing’s initial confidence 
after two decades of naval improvements under self-strengthener Zuo Zongtang and forced China to recognized 
French control of Vietnam in the 1885 Treaty of Tianjin. The loss of the First Sino-Japanese War to a former 
tributary state a decade later only multiplied the feelings of national embarrassment provoked by the self-
strengthening movement’s failure. 
29
 The Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the First Sino-Japanese War, granting Japan Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, 
and the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria, as well as practical control over Korea and the same invasive rights 
afforded the Western powers on Chinese soil. 
30
 Jonathan Spence, The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895-1980 (New York: Viking, 
1981), p. 37. 
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aggression and restore its international prominence by adopting Western technology, promoting 
industry, and developing modern networks of finance and infrastructure, but in contrast to the 
superficiality of the self-strengtheners’ reforms, such as scholar-official Zhang Zhidong’s 
program of “Western technology with a Chinese soul” (中学为体，西学为用 zhongxue wei ti, 
xixue wei yong),31 Kang sought to fight the problem at the root, grafting Western knowledge onto 
the very core of Confucian scholarship.32 
This unorthodox solution was founded in Kang’s interpretation of Confucianism, laid out 
in his ground-breaking Study of Confucius as a Reformer (孔子改制靠 Kongzi gaizhi kao). To 
Kang, Confucius was an advocate of change, not of reactionary dogma, and to this end the great 
sage had “founded his teaching to reform [the] institutions” of his own time.33 Kang’s calls for 
reform eventually found the sympathetic ear of the Emperor Guangxu himself, who adopted 
Kang’s recommendations when he launched the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898.34 However, a 
reactionary coup led by Dowager Empress Cixi seized the capital, arrested the emperor, and 
sentenced Kang to death.35 Although he escaped the headsman’s axe, Kang Youwei never 
                                                 
31
 Formerly an advocate of outright military opposition to Western incursions, Zhang changed his stance after the 
defeat in the Sino-French War and became one of the major self-strengtheners of the late nineteenth century. He 
focused on modernizing the Chinese army, establishing an arsenal and mint in the city of Wuhan and modernizing 
its garrison. These foreign-trained and -equipped troops would later be responsible for the Wuchang Uprising that 
prompted the Xinhai Revolution. 
32
 Spence, pp. 37-41. 
“Indeed, if we make a complete change, we shall become strong, but if we only make limited changes, we shall still 
perish. If Your Majesty and his ministers investigate the source of the disease, you will know that this is the right 
prescription.” Kang Youwei, “The Need for Reforming Institutions,” in Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 2, ed. 
William Theodore de Bary, p. 269. 
33
 Kang Youwei, “Confucius as a Reformer,” in Sources of Chinese Tradition, p. 266. 
34
 “The Emperor issued edicts abolishing the formalistic ‘eight-legged essay’ system, establishing a national 
university, converting local temples into schools, setting up one group of local bureaus to develop Qing commerce 
and others to develop agriculture and industry.” Spence, p. 50. 
35
 The widow of the Xianfeng Emperor (r. 1850-1861), Cixi served as regent for twelve years during the reign of the 
Tongzhi Emperor (r. 1861-1875), and following his early death in she resumed control until Guangxu came of age in 
1889. Despite her active role in the Tongzhi Restoration, by the time of Guangxu’s reign Cixi had become one of the 
most implacable opponents of reform in the Qing court. 
Stephen Hurley 
14 
 
regained his lost influence,36 and the Qing court did not implement any further reforms until the 
devastating indemnity imposed on China by the Boxer Protocol of 1901 convinced Cixi of the 
need for change.37 
After the failure of Hundred Days’ Reform, the American-educated doctor Sun Yat-sen, 
who had previously submitted his own memorandum for reform to the eminent statesman Li 
Hongzhang,38 now became “convinced that the Manchus must be dislodged by revolution if 
China’s future were to be secured.”39 Sun’s revolution, however, was not to be like the uprisings 
that had characterized dynastic change since the dawn of Chinese civilization. Instead, inspired 
by Western republican ideals, Sun hoped to abolish the imperial system altogether and replace it 
with democracy, the second of his “Three Principles of the People” (三民主义 Sanmin Zhuyi) 
that would later serve as the theoretical foundation for the Nationalist Party.40 To this end, his 
Revolutionary Alliance launched a series of armed uprisings against the Qing government, 
ultimately culminating in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution that finally overthrew the Manchu regime. 
Despite the political and ideological differences between the reformers and the 
revolutionaries, they were both propelled by the need to save China from the existential threat of 
Western imperialism. Monarchist intellectual Yan Fu’s translations of Thomas Huxley’s 
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Evolution and Ethics in 1895 and On Evolution in 1898 had introduced the Chinese intelligentsia 
to the ideas of Social Darwinism, and the new nationalist discourse developed beneath the 
penumbra of Social Darwinism’s millenarian doctrine of a final racial showdown.41 In this view, 
China’s conflict with the West was merely an instance of a larger confrontation between the 
white and yellow races, while the Western powers’ acquisition of China’s former tributary states 
and deep penetration into China proper was a case of natural selection, proving the evolutionary 
fitness of Western technological and political ideas and portending China’s ultimate defeat at 
their hands.42 The revolutionaries’ conception of the Qing as ethnic foreigners, and of their 
retainers as hanjian, sprang from ideas founded in the idea of this racial confrontation. 
In the eyes of reformers and revolutionaries alike, the only way China could endure in the 
apocalyptic struggle between the races was if it learned from the Western model and became 
“animated by the vigorous group ‘spirit’ (jingsheng) of ‘nationalism’ (minzu zhuyi).”43 Liang 
Qichao, Kang Youwei’s most prominent disciple, described the Chinese nation as a sleeping lion, 
an intricate, man-made machine with “internal components which at a slight 
trigger would utilize feisty teeth and claws to bite and grab, defeating at least a 
thousand men.” Regrettably, “the machine has been abandoned too long…unless 
the machine is renewed, this wonderful and Godlike creature shall sleep forever.” 
In Liang’s view, China’s future can no longer be dependent upon a natural 
awakening, and must rely on human intervention to provide her with a new 
mechanism, thus offering her new hope for a safer tomorrow.44 
 
Similarly, Sun Yat-sen repeatedly despaired that the Chinese people were as divided and 
malleable as “a tray of loose sand,” doomed to succumb to the predations of the West unless it 
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could somehow congeal into a unified nation.45 Survival in the Darwinian conflict required 
cohesion, which in turn required the Chinese people to come together as a single people behind 
the banner of a unitary state. 
However, the question of how this Chinese nation was to be defined soon proved “an 
integral part of the ideological battle between the reformists and the revolutionaries.”46 Each 
group strove to justify its political agenda through its own interpretation of what it meant to be 
Chinese. While the reformers drew upon pan-Asian cultural and ethnic similarities to promote an 
alliance with other Asian nations as fellow members of the “yellow race,” the revolutionaries 
painted China as “a pure and untainted Han racial community” that could only achieve nation 
status once freed from the Manchu yoke.47 
For Kang Youwei, nations served as a natural step in the evolutionary process of human 
development.48 His magnum opus, The Great Commonality (大同书 Datong shu), characterized 
history as divided into three eras, the Age of Disorder, the Age of Order, and the Age of Great 
Peace. China’s growing interaction with the West marked the transition from Disorder to Order, 
and as a result she needed to develop new institutions in harmony with the new epoch.49 While 
the Age of Great Peace would be characterized by universal brotherhood and the dissolution of 
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national boundaries, for now China was in the midst of “an era of competition between states,” 
making reform impossible without a fixed national policy.50  
Fortunately, Kang believed, human beings are naturally inclined toward nationalist 
sentiments, which “give pleasure to man’s nature”: 
Being that we are born into one country, have received [its] civilization…and… 
knowledge, then we have the responsibilities of a citizen. If we…abandon this 
country, this country will perish and its people will be annihilated, and then 
civilization will be destroyed.51 
 
This “one country” was an inclusive identity, founded in the common Confucian underpinnings 
of Eastern civilization. In Kang’s portrayal of the clash of nations, Han and Manchu alike needed 
to unite to preserve their common lineage.52 
Kang’s student Liang Qichao saw China’s struggle with the West in even more stridently 
Darwinian terms, arguing that history was driven by “the citizenry’s struggle for survival, which 
is irrepressible according to the laws of natural selection and survival of the fittest.”53 Of all the 
formations in which people could be arranged for this struggle, “the nation was ‘the most nearly 
perfect,’ for only through it could men defend themselves in war and share their lives in 
peace.”54 However, although Liang believed that the nation itself was an organic unit, the vast 
majority of Chinese remained ignorant of their position as components of the national body.55 
The Chinese nation could only be preserved by plucking its members from their Platonic cave of 
imperial subjectivity and deliberately creating a new consciousness of their position as modern 
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citizens (国民 guomin), the act of “human intervention” that would awaken and refresh the 
sleeping lion.56 
To Liang Qichao, the source of China’s national ignorance was its lack of a unified 
national history.  Throughout the millennia of imperial rule, history was 
all written for the rulers and their officials; none was written for nationals 
(guomin). [The classical histories’] biggest flaw is that they did not know the 
distinction between the imperial regime and the state (guojia), knowing no state 
apart from the court…Therefore, there were debates over orthodox and 
illegitimate regimes…A has the Mandate of Heaven, and B is a rebel…Historians 
of the last few thousand years were responsible for China’s inability to develop 
nationalism.57 
 
The solution was to restructure China’s history and identity as that of a single nation, particularly 
through education and standardizing reforms to the Chinese language.58 However, even though 
China’s dynastic past was the source of its national weakness, this new national consciousness 
did not require the overthrow of either the imperial system or even the Qing dynasty. The 
virtuous progression of the Mandate of Heaven had been delegitimized by China’s encounter 
with the West,59 but just as Meiji Japan had internalized Western political ideas while keeping 
the emperor on the throne, Liang maintained that China “could have social revolution without 
dynastic overthrow.”60 Furthermore, Liang founded his discussion of guomin in ethnically 
inclusive language, rallying both Han and Manchu to the banner of the Chinese nation. Liang 
described Chinese either as Huangren (黄人), the “yellow people/race,” or Huazu (华族), the 
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“flower lineage.”61 Both Manchu and Han “belonged to the same yellow race,” while the term 
“Hua” described Chinese civilization as a whole, from overseas Chinese to China’s former 
tributaries to even the Japanese, on account of their common writing system and cultural 
foundation.62 
Like the reformers, the anti-Qing revolutionaries also characterized China’s encounter 
with the West in terms of a Darwinian evolutionary struggle, which ultimately informed both 
their definition of the Chinese nation and their creation of a new category of hanjian. In his 
famous tract The Revolutionary Army (革命军 Gemingjun), the young intellectual Zou Rong 
described this clash of civilizations: 
The yellow and white races which are to be found on the globe have been 
endowed by nature with intelligence and fighting capacity. They are 
fundamentally incapable of giving way to each other. Hence, glowering and 
poised for a fight they have engaged in battle in the world of evolution, the great 
arena where strength and intelligence have clashed since earliest times, the great 
theater where for so long natural selection and progress have been played out.63 
 
The players in this spectacle are the nations of the world, which Zou, like Liang Qichao, saw as 
the natural outgrowth of tribes and clans.64 
Zou, however, had little concern for Kang and Liang’s respect for the imperial system 
and desire for Han-Manchu solidarity. In his view, China under the Qing regime had “lost its 
sovereignty to foreigners (wairen)” and could not possibly achieve the unity of nation and state 
as long as the Han people remained subjugated to Manchu rulers.65 Zou’s tract is addressed to 
the “400 million of the great Han race,” whom he orders to “annihilate the five million and more 
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of the furry and horned Manchu.” The need for this revolution “arises precisely from the 
question of whether our race will go under and be exterminated,” and the assassination of the 
emperor, the expulsion of the Manchu from China proper, and the establishment of republican 
democracy are necessary if “China is to survive for long in the new world of the 20th century.”66 
While other revolutionaries were hardly as extreme in their views or vitriolic in their 
rhetoric, they too characterized China as “the China of the Chinese of the Han race.”67 In an 
article published in Guominbao in 1901, the revolutionary Zhang Binglin attacked Liang 
Qichao’s inclusive national portrait by using the terms hanren (汉人), hanzu (汉族), and 
hanzhong (汉种) to differentiate the Manchus from Han Chinese. Two years later the 
revolution’s “golden boy” Wang Jingwei, himself later to become one of China’s most 
prominent hanjian, published an article that asked “who are the Chinese? It is the Han race (Han 
renzhong).”68 
Sun Yat-sen’s definition of the Chinese nation was more nuanced. Like Liang Qichao, he 
believed each human grouping (族 zu) was an organic collective that reflected humans’ innate 
desire for collective association. The largest of these groupings was race (人种 renzhong), which 
was then subdivided into ethnic nations (民族 minzu). Although the Han and Manchu were both 
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members of the yellow race, each formed a separate minzu branch, along with the Mongols, 
Malays, and Japanese.69 In Sun’s view, it was only when the minzu of the world achieved 
political parity that Kang Youwei’s “Great Harmony” could be realized.70 To this end, he called 
for the construction of a Chinese state (国 guo), an artificial political body to provide the nation 
with control and guidance. This state’s ideal form would be a democratic republic, which would 
preserve national unity by preventing a struggle for power within the minzu.71 
Following the revolutionaries’ victory in 1911, it was Sun Yat-sen’s vision of the nation 
that ultimately defined the new China as a republican nation-state. Although some radicals 
launched anti-Manchu campaigns of revenge, Sun himself, always the pragmatist, further 
moderated his views after coming to power, declaring China “a Republic of Five Races (五族共
和 wuzu gonghe) or a single, unified Chinese nation/race (中华民族 Zhonghua minzu).”72 
Nevertheless, the racial ideology of the more rabid revolutionaries and Liang Qichao’s views on 
national citizenship each had a lasting impact on Chinese nationalism and the meaning of 
hanjian. 
The most enduring product of the revolutionaries’ anti-Manchu rhetoric is the 
contemporary view of “Hanzu” as a unified ethnic group. In order to unify the Chinese against 
the Qing, and drawing on the Western racial ideas introduced by Yan Fu, the revolutionaries 
forged the previously loose Han descriptor into a common ethnic narrative, describing the Han as 
a people linked by the shared blood of Huangdi, the quasi-mythical founder of Chinese 
civilization. They created lineage histories with Huangdi as the founder of the “nation-state of 
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the Han race” (汉种民族的国家 Hanzhong minzu de guojia) and common ancestor of all Han 
people.73 In doing so, they sought, in the words of cultural historian Kai-wing Chow, to 
…create a history of the Chinese as an aggressive, mobile, and outward-looking 
people, a race that had proven successful in surviving the ruthless competition 
dictated by the evolutionary law of the Darwinian world. This history provides the 
ground for the Hanzu to rebound from the conquest by the Manchus.74 
 
The establishment of Hanzu as a specific ethnic category has had lasting repercussions 
for the meaning of hanjian. Limiting “China” to the Han ethnic group indelibly marks Qing 
retainers as hanjian, even such popular officials such as Zeng Guofan, whose reputation was 
rehabilitated after the founding of the Republic, and Lin Zexu, whose prominent role in resisting 
Western aggression had previously left his virtue beyond question.75 Despite both Nationalist 
and Communists’ repeated emphasis on national multiculturalism, the ethnic connotation that 
hanjian acquired as a result of the anti-Qing revolution has never been fully expunged, leading to 
a series of problems that will be further examined in the following chapters. 
The shift in loyalty from the imperial throne to the national community has also created a 
new set of responsibilities for that community’s members. As Liang Qichao points out, “there 
can be no bodies where the limbs are broken, guts are rotten, and blood is dry; similarly, there 
can be no state where the guomin are frivolous, cowardly, and weak.”76 However, loyalty to a 
nation is a much fuzzier idea than loyalty to a single man. Is national loyalty an obligation to 
land or to human beings? At what point has one failed one’s responsibility to the nation, and 
what should be the consequences? These became questions of first importance after the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, during the trials of collaborators I examine in my next chapter. 
                                                 
73
 Chow, “Narrating Nation,” pp. 59, 62. 
74
 Ibid, p. 63. 
75
 Guo and He, “Reimagining the Chinese Nation,” pp. 144, 150. 
76
 Shen, “Discourse on Guomin,” p. 16. 
Stephen Hurley 
23 
 
Chapter 2 
Prosecuting Hanjian: Collaboration and the Search for a Postwar Narrative 
 
In contemporary Chinese, the term hanjian generally refers to collaborators in the Second 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), known in China as the War to Resist Japan (抗日战争 Kangri 
Zhanzheng). Even nearly seventy years after the conflict, this remains hanjian’s most commonly 
intended meaning, and with reason. The war against Japan lasted for eight years of brutal 
occupation, taking some twenty million Chinese lives and searing an indelible image into the 
Chinese mass consciousness. 
Although collaboration is common to almost every experience of occupation, it was a 
particularly prominent feature of the stagnation and guerrilla warfare that characterized the Sino-
Japanese conflict. Historian David Barrett describes the Japanese military’s position in China as 
a system of “points  and lines,” with its strength concentrated in urban centers and major towns, 
as well as the lines of supply and communication between them. While this web remained strong 
throughout the war, the gaps between its strands meant that areas of countryside nominally under 
occupation remained hives of anti-Japanese activity.77 In order to consolidate their authority and 
provide their occupation with some mantle of legitimacy, the Japanese established puppet 
regimes in the capital cities of Nanjing and Beiping.78 At the grassroots level, Japanese officials 
coopted translators, businessmen, and local leaders to carry out the functions of day-to-day 
governance. All of these figures were labeled as hanjian, both by Chiang Kai-shek’s government 
in Chongqing and by the Communist rebels in the countryside and revolutionary base areas. 
They were subject to violent reprisals and, eventually, legal persecution at the end of the war. 
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After the conclusion of the war in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government 
passed the “Regulations for the Punishment of Hanjian,” and hanjian expanded from a term of 
abuse to a legal category. This criminalization of hanjian is significant in several ways. The 
hanjian trials, particularly those of high-profile collaborators such as Chen Bijun, the wife of 
former president of the Japanese puppet government Wang Jingwei, Wang’s successor Chen 
Gongbo, and Zhou Fohai, Chen Gongbo’s second-in-command, played a key role in the postwar 
debate over national narratives of resistance and collaboration. In addition, the trials’ nature as 
political witch hunts, and resulting fast-and-loose treatment of the hanjian category sparked the 
first debate over the nature of hanjian’s ethnic connotations when Taiwanese defendants 
protested against the application of the term to former Japanese subjects such as themselves. 
Even before the outbreak of open conflict, the Japanese had played a crucial—and often 
antagonistic—role in the development of Chinese nationalism. Although Sun Yat-sen looked to 
Japan as a friend and ally in his pan-Asian vision, his feelings were not shared by many of his 
countrymen.79 Chinese attitudes toward Japan had already begun to sour following the 1895 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, and further deteriorated in 1915 after Japanese Prime Minister Okuma 
Shigenobu presented Yuan Shikai, a former Qing marshal and the first president of the Republic 
of China, with a demeaning list of twenty-one demands including the installation of Japanese 
advisors at all levels of the Chinese government.80 A few years later, after Japan secured legal 
possession of former German holdings in Shandong province in the Treaty of Versailles, China’s 
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simmering resentment at these repeated offenses was unleashed in the May Fourth Incident, a 
massive popular wave of nationalistic, anti-Western, and anti-Japanese sentiment that swept the 
country in 1919, and a series of anti-Japanese boycotts that continued sporadically throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s.81 
Despite escalating popular opinion against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun’s successor in 
the Nationalist party and China’s de facto ruler after 1928, retreated in the face of continuing 
Japanese aggression. He instead chose a policy of “domestic pacification before external 
resistance” (先安内后攘外 xian annei hou rangwai), focusing on eliminating the Chinese 
Communist Party, with whom the Nationalists had violently broken in 1927, before addressing 
the problem of the Japanese.82 When the Japanese Kwantung Army swept over Manchuria 
following the Mukden Incident (九一八事变 Jiuyiba Shijian) of September 18, 1931, Chiang 
ordered northeastern warlord Zhang Xueliang to pull back. Chiang’s focus was only turned to 
Japan in 1936 by the so-called Xi’an Incident, in which he was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang 
and forced at gunpoint to agree to a new anti-Japanese United Front with the Communists. The 
Nationalists’ newly-firm position set the stage for open warfare, which began on July 7, 1937 
with a skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge outside Beiping. 
The war was, at first, a disaster for China. The Japanese launched a massive amphibious 
invasion of the Yangzi river delta, routing the Nationalist army outside Shanghai and brutally 
sacking the capital of Nanjing in December of that year. However, Chiang refused Japanese 
advances for a peace settlement, instead withdrawing his army and government inland to the city 
                                                 
81
 See Karl Gerth, “Chapter 4: The Movement and Anti-Imperialists Boycotts, 1923-1937,” in China Made: 
Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 125-200. 
82
 Wang Ke-wen, “Wang Jingwei and the Policy Origins of the ‘Peace Movement,’ 1932-1937,” in Barrett and Shyu, 
Chinese Collaboration with Japan, p. 23. 
Stephen Hurley 
26 
 
of Chongqing, while Communist guerrillas remained active in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region 
and even within Japanese-occupied areas.83 This uneasy and violent balance remained the status 
quo for the remainder of the conflict, as the Japanese were unable to press inland and put a 
definitive end to the Nationalist resistance or to eliminate the Communist presence behind their 
own battle lines, while both Chinese armies lacked the organization, materiel, and manpower to 
expel the Japanese. 
After Chiang Kai-shek rejected their initial peace proposals in January of 1938, Japanese 
Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro issued what came to be known as the “aite ni sezu” edict, in 
which he declared that Japan “would not deal” with the Chiang regime. Instead, Japan looked to 
“the establishment of a new Chinese regime, harmonious coordination with which [could] really 
be counted upon.”84 As the war began to drag on, such a face-saving alternative became 
increasingly favorable, one the Japanese found in the person of Wang Jingwei. Termed the 
“golden boy of Chinese nationalism” by historian R. Keith Schoppa for a dramatic but 
unsuccessful attempt to assassinate a Qing official in his youth,85 Wang was one of the leading 
figures of the GMD and had already headed a left-wing opposition government in Wuhan during 
the Northern Expedition that had reclaimed China for the Nationalists in 1928.86 Following the 
aite ni sezu pronouncement, Wang opened his own peace negotiations with the Japanese, 
promising the support of left GMD officials. When this support failed to materialize, Wang fled 
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to Hanoi before establishing a new “Reorganized Government of the Republic of China” in 
cooperation with Japan. 
Founded in a dramatic “return to the capital” (还都 huandu) on March 30, 1940, the 
Reorganized Government appropriated Nationalist iconography and rhetoric, including the GMD 
flag and Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, in an attempt to present itself as an 
authentic representative of the Chinese nation.87 However, Wang’s regime was ultimately unable 
to satisfy either side. His “Nationalist” government never came to represent the entirety of 
occupied China, much less the Chinese people as a whole, since the northern puppet government 
established after the fall of Beiping in 1937 remained “a separate administrative enclave” under 
the North China Area Army’s direct control.88 At the same time, Wang remained largely 
powerless to ameliorate the conditions of the occupation, as continuing conflict with Chiang Kai-
shek in the west and launching of “pacification campaigns” into the occupied areas meant 
Japan’s approximate troop strength remained constant until the end of the war.89 
In addition to the formal collaborationist regimes, the Japanese occupation forces also 
relied heavily on local collaborators to fight communism and facilitate local administration. As 
the historian Timothy Brook notes in his monograph, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local 
Elites in Wartime China, Japanese intelligence forces would follow the military and enlist local 
elites, whose established resources and authority made them ideal interlocutors for their Japanese 
masters. The reasons for their compliance were diverse: some collaborators hoped to profit, 
either politically or financially, from the opportunity presented by the social upheaval of the 
Japanese invasion, while others feared for their survival or that of their family or village if they 
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did not give the Japanese what they wanted. Most fell somewhere on the sliding scale between 
opportunism and survival. The scale and diversity of this group, as well as the hazy definition of 
collaboration, would contribute to the complexity of the definition, and eventual punishment, of 
wartime hanjian.90 
Unlike Wang Jingwei and his compatriots in Nanjing, protected by miles of Japanese-
held territory and their own private security forces, local collaborators were open targets, and 
frequently subject to assassination.91 The Japanese military was spread too thin on the ground to 
provide adequate protection for rural collaborators,92 but even Japanese-occupied cities were not 
free from vengeance against hanjian. In his article “Hanjian!” Frederic Wakeman, Jr. examines 
anti-hanjian activities throughout the war in the city of Shanghai, which was one of the first to 
fall to Japan and had featured a significant Japanese presence since the 1932 Shanghai Incident.93 
He describes how communist resistance fighters appealed to Chinese citizens’ national loyalty to 
form assassination squads to seek out and eliminate collaborators. 
Resentment of hanjians’ betrayal of their native land, relatively favorable wartime 
treatment by the occupation forces, and complicity in Japanese atrocities exploded after the war 
into an intensive two-year period of “dealing with hanjian.” The CCP carried out retributive 
attacks on former collaborators while the Nationalist government passed the Regulations for the 
Punishment of Hanjian, which made “hanjianism” a criminal charge. The Guomindang arrested 
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4692 persons by the end of 1945, and throughout the two-year period of prosecution more than 
25,000 accused hanjian were brought to trial.94 
Wang Jingwei had died of natural causes in 1944, but his successor, Chen Gongbo, was 
put on trial in April of 1946. A longtime associate of Wang Jingwei, Chen had served as minister 
of industry in the Guomindang cabinet from 1932 to 1936, resigning after Wang retreated to 
Europe to recover from an assassination attempt.95 Like Philippe Pétain, the leader of the Vichy 
regime and French arch-collaborator whose trial the Chinese news services followed eagerly, 
Chen conceded that he had cooperated with the enemy, but claimed he had done so for 
nationalist reasons.96 Convinced that the war with Japan was lost, Wang and Chen had attempted 
to “preserve a little vitality for the nation, as the stepping-stone for future nation-building” by 
collaborating with the Japanese in order to preserve an economic base from which China could 
eventually regain its compromised sovereignty.97 
Similar arguments that they had protected the Chinese people were presented by 
prominent collaborators Zhou Fohai and Chen Bijun. Zhou, who had served as a member of 
Chiang’s CC Clique before defecting in 1938,98 argued that he had consistently sought to serve 
China’s best interest, serving as an intermediary with Japan after the initial collapse of the front 
in south China and late secretly reestablishing contacts with Chongqing. Furthermore, he claimed 
people in the occupied areas could make a stable living under the strong 
centralized leadership of the Nanjing Collaborationist Government, 
which…Chongqing had never been able to do during the war.99 
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According to Wang Jingwei’s widow Chen Bijun, the “head female traitor” (头号女汉奸 
touhao nühanjian), 
when Guangdong was under Japanese attack in 1938, she could not find any state 
authorities whose responsibility was the protection of local people there, and that 
she and other collaborators in Guangdong on behalf of the state had to make every 
effort to save the people there, including peace and collaboration with Japan. 
From her perspective, Chiang Kai-shek and his government had committed a 
serious crime by not taking care of the people and the nation.100 
 
The Guomindang courts had little interest in such “traitors’ reasoning” (汉奸理论 
hanjian lilun).101 Chen Gongbo was sentenced to death after a six-day trial and promptly shot, 
while Zhou Fohai and Chen Bijun were both sentenced to life imprisonment. However, as 
collaboration specialist Margherita Zanasi points out, and as the wartime assassinations and 
extralegal postwar punishments of collaborators evince, “heightened nationalism and popular 
resentment would certainly have been enough to bring harsh retribution down on 
collaborators.”102 Instead, the hanjian trials had simultaneous goals of nation-building and 
political expediency. 
During the war Nationalists had used the charge of hanjianism as a blanket term to 
suppress Communists and other dissidents, and the postwar trials were therefore an extension of 
preexisting Nationalist policies.103 By executing his former political opponents as hanjian, 
Chiang Kai-shek could finally avenge himself upon the GMD’s left wing, with which he had 
clashed since the mid-1920s. Meanwhile, the sheer number of hanjian trials, conducted within 
such a short period, implies that legal accuracy was not the Nationalists’ chief priority. Wakeman 
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remarks that “right-wing Nationalists regarded the Communists as hanjian as well,” and it would 
be all too easy to ensure figures who caused trouble during the Guomindang’s reestablishment of 
national control met the same fate as Chen Gongbo.104 
This callously political aspect of the trials is reinforced by the intervention of the GMD 
secret police, or Juntong. Commanded by spymaster Dai Li, the éminence grise of the Nationalist 
regime, the secret police was responsible for the assassination of a number of high-ranking 
collaborationist officials during the war,105 but the Juntong had also taken advantage of “its 
contact with ‘traitors’ (hanjian) in occupied areas to place special operations units in Shanghai, 
Nanjing, and other parts of southeastern China.”106 After the war, Dai repaid his contacts by 
placing them into protective custody or ensuring their acquittal, regardless of their wartime 
behavior.107 Zhou Fohai, who was initially given the death penalty, had frequently 
communicated with Dai during his time in Nanjing, and his Juntong contacts may have been the 
reason for the remission of his sentence.108 
Furthermore, Chiang’s longstanding policy of domestic pacification before external 
resistance left him vulnerable to Communist accusations that he had not tried his utmost to expel 
the Japanese. On May 25, 1936, six months before the Xi’an Incident finally turned Chiang’s 
attention to the Japanese menace, Mao Zedong sent a letter to Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan 
…likening "Mr Chiang's" (Jiang shi) behaviour to that of a “traitor to the Han 
race and to the nation” (hanjian maiguozei wuyu weibi) and calling on Yan's 
forces to unite with the CCP to "oppose Chiang and resist Japan" (fan Jiang, kang 
Ri) in order to “expel the common enemy of the Chinese people.” The use of the 
old slogan fan Jiang, rather than the new bi Jiang and other aspects of the letter 
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strongly implied that the “common enemy” to be expelled was none other than 
Chiang himself.109 
 
By rejecting the “collaborationist nationalism” of Chen and his ilk, then, Chiang hoped to 
reinforce his position as a figure of resistance in the eyes of the Chinese people and prepare for 
the upcoming showdown with the Communists. 
Finally, the Nationalist courts’ fast-and-loose handling of the hanjian category also 
provoked questions about the term’s ethnic subtext. In 1947, following a popular uprising against 
the Guomindang occupation, the interim Taiwanese government submitted a forty-two point 
memorandum to Nanjing that included a request for the release of all Taiwanese hanjian 
imprisoned on the mainland.110 It argued that, as Taiwan had been a Japanese colony during the 
war, Taiwanese citizens could not possibly be traitors to China. This justification was further 
extended by ethnic Taiwanese who faced accusations of hanjianism. They were not Han, how 
could they possibly be hanjian? However, as with the trials of collaborationist officials, the 
Nationalists were largely uninterested in the arguments for the defense. In March of 1946, the 
Committee for Unified Interpretation of Rules and Regulations of the Judicial Ministry issued 
interpretation #3078, which established hanjian as a criminal charge for all individuals, not just 
Chinese. As a result, the Nationalists ultimately tried one Lithuanian, one Hungarian, one 
Russian, one Frenchman, and two Portuguese as hanjian in Shanghai.111 
Ultimately, the legal complexities of hanjian’s criminal status proved less important than 
the larger role of the postwar trials in shaping a monolithic narrative of resistance heroes pitted 
against Japanese invaders and their collaborator lackeys. For Chiang, the quibbles of quislings 
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were of paltry significance compared to legitimizing his return to national power and preparing 
for an ultimate confrontation with the Communists. However, the interpretations of the Chinese 
nation born from the experience of collaboration have had a far-reaching impact. As Timothy 
Brook notes, 
the myth of resistance has been a powerful moral weapon in the arsenals that 
political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have used to sustain their 
postwar dictatorships. Each party claims that it alone defeated the Japanese, and 
each stakes its moral legitimacy—its right to rule—on that claim.112 
 
The primary role of anti-Japanese resistance in the foundational myths of the People’s Republic 
brings us to my final chapter: hanjian in Red and contemporary China. 
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Chapter 3 
A Harmonious Society? Hanjian in the People’s Republic 
 
The founding of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing on October 1st, 1949 did not 
only establish a new state and a new government. It also brought with it a new conception of 
China as a revolutionary community, as well as new categories of hanjian as class and 
ideological enemies were attacked for their crimes against the new China. Since Mao’s death in 
1976, the People’s Republic has increasingly abandoned this revolutionary conception of the 
nation as it has moved away from socialism, leading a number of Chinese scholars to reexamine 
the figures condemned as hanjian by the traditional Party historiography. However, as feelings 
of national pride among Chinese youth continue to grow, this search for academic precision has 
been offset by an explosion of anti-hanjian rhetoric, especially online. While the Chinese 
government has stoked these incendiary emotions through a number of patriotic initiatives, 
popular opposition to hanjian does not always serve its interests, and it must be increasingly 
careful not to be consumed by the flames. 
Even before Mao’s famous declaration that “the Chinese people have stood up,” 113 
nationalism was an integral component of CCP ideology. In an essay from 1937 describing the 
Communists’ opposition to the Japanese invasion, Mao declared that “we are at once 
internationalists and patriots, and our slogan is, ‘Fight to defend the motherland against the 
aggressors.’”114 Inspired by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s theory of “socialism in one country,”115 
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Mao sought to integrate Chinese nationalism with international socialism, characterizing the 
Communist struggle as a war against imperialist aggression,116 whether in the form of the 
Japanese invasion, “the running dog of imperialism” Chiang Kai-shek,117 or “U.S. aggressors” 
and “U.S. imperialists” during the Korean War.118 By pitting the CCP against the Western 
powers, he was able to synthesize Vladimir Lenin’s doctrine of predatory capitalist imperialism 
with longstanding Chinese resentment of the “hundred years of humiliation” it had suffered at 
the hands of the West.119 The pursuit of these national interests “constituted the CCP’s most 
potent basis of legitimacy because the party claimed to lead a revolution that had begun as a 
movement of national liberation,” even as that nation was being re-imagined along class lines.120 
Within this new China there were two places one could find hanjian: prisons and history 
books. A number of landlords, capitalists, Nationalist sympathizers, and other ideological 
undesirables were imprisoned as hanjian during the Campaign to Suppress 
Counterrevolutionaries (镇压反革命, zhenya fan geming) of 1950-1953.121 Meanwhile, Party 
historians applied the term to historical figures who were judged to be on the “wrong” side of 
history for their reactionary views or behavior.122 In his 1943 pamphlet The Life of the Traitor-
Butcher Zeng Guofan (汉奸刽子手曾国藩的一生, Hanjian guizishou Zeng Guofan de yisheng), 
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prominent Marxist historian Fan Wenlan, one of the most powerful voices in Communist 
historiography, denounced the nineteenth-century viceroy not only for his loyalty to the Qing but, 
more importantly, for his major role in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), a 
fourteen-year-long uprising that engulfed south-central China and claimed some twenty million 
lives. In the eyes of the CCP historians, the largely peasant uprising was a “progressive” 
historical force, and Zeng’s opposition an act of social betrayal.123 
Neither class enemies nor historical “reactionaries” were hanjian by any previous 
definition, but the application of the term to the Party’s enemies had definite political benefits. 
The atmosphere of national resistance remained highly charged from the period of dealing with 
hanjian (which had concluded a scant three years before the campaign was initiated) and was 
only intensified during the Korean conflict, during which the Party “defined enemies of the state 
as saboteurs, fifth columns, and subverters of national unity.”124 Invoking the term allowed also 
the CCP to channel rage over the still-fresh wounds of the Second Sino-Japanese War toward the 
enemies of the newly formed party-state. 
The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the first attempt at mass mobilization 
and the consolidation of state control, was the perfect grounds for such a maneuver. 
Characterizing counterrevolutionary elements as hanjian would help to accomplish two of the 
campaign’s chief goals, those of motivating the populace and eliminating ideological 
opponents.125 As in the postwar trials conducted by the Nationalist government, the flexibility of 
the accusations seems to indicated the trials were motivated by results and political expediency 
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rather than balanced consideration and due process. Local cadres were ordered to “not fear 
executing people, only to fear mistakenly executing people,”126 while the line between 
hanjianism and other forms of counterrevolutionary activity was often blurry, if drawn at all.127 
Nevertheless, the extension of the hanjian label to rightists, reactionaries, landlords, and 
capitalists rather than just collaborators can also be interpreted within the framework of Mao’s 
socialist nationalism. Communist China was defined in terms of “a revolutionary identity [based] 
on the foundation of a worker-peasant alliance.”128 The Marxist-Leninist ideas that informed this 
worldview were extended to China’s past in order to create a monolithic narrative of a 
progressive and revolutionary Chinese nation, which had united to oppose feudalism and 
imperialism before the CCP was even founded. The key events in this nation’s history, from the 
Taiping movement through the “bourgeois-democratic” Xinhai Revolution and finally the war 
against Japan, constituted a gradual progression toward the eventual construction of a socialist 
society.129 
From this perspective, those who betrayed the revolution, whether literally or 
ideologically, were traitors to revolutionary China as a whole. During the Sino-Japanese War, 
Party members who had abandoned the struggle and “betrayed Marxism” or “betrayed their 
original class background” were branded as hanjian and eliminated.130 Chen Duxiu, one of the 
CCP’s founding members and a major force in the development of Chinese Communism, was 
expelled from the Party in 1929 after accusations were brought by secret police chief Kang 
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Sheng and Comintern-backed senior Communist Wang Ming that Chen had become a hanjian by 
working for the Japanese. However, the real reason for Chen’s dismissal was doctrinal 
differences with Mao.131 To some extent, ideological opposition was worse, since incorrect ideas 
could infect other Party members and prevent them from adopting the proper class line, inflicting 
further harm to the national revolutionary community. The idea of this community, which Fan 
Wenlan’s historical accounts were helping to create, influenced historical judgments in turn, as 
the reactionary Qing were condemned as national enemies.132 The Communists denounced 
scholar-officials like Zeng Guofan, then, for the same apparent reasons as the anti-Qing 
revolutionaries, although their judgments were informed by very different ideological contexts. 
Despite the intensity and scope of Mao’s vision, since his death the CCP has gradually 
moved away from its socialist roots and with them the conception of the nation as a 
revolutionary community. The Party’s Marxist rhetoric has proven increasingly shallow as the 
government openly supports capitalism and MacDonald’s restaurants sprout on Beijing street 
corners like hawthorn blossoms. Instead, the Chinese government emphasizes China’s national 
character as Zhonghua minzu in a fusion of Soviet-style cosmopolitanism, Sun Yat-sen’s 
Republic of Five Races, and Liang Qichao’s vision of a nation founded on the shared history and 
culture of Chinese civilization. This nationalist pride has a broad appeal, and it is encouraged by 
the Party in order to instill loyalty through patriotism, fill the red sun-shaped hole left in people’s 
hearts by the demise of Marxism, and counterbalance the increasing influence of Western culture 
resulting from globalization, foreign investment, and the international mass media.133 
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The movement away from socialism, with its associated class judgments, has led Chinese 
scholars to reconsider figures traditionally considered hanjian within the Party historiography. 
Chen Duxiu was rehabilitated as early as 1980,134 and Zeng Guofan has experienced a dramatic 
resurgence, both academically and popularly, since the mid-1980s.135 The abandoning of class 
categories, and the additional emphasis on the PRC as a multiethnic state in the post-Mao era 
have called into question the reasons for which these figures were originally considered 
hanjian.136 The general consensus among Chinese historians is that ideological considerations 
are an insufficient justification to condemn bourgeois officials as traitors, while their loyalty is 
equally untarnished since Manchus are included within the fifty-six ethnic groups that constitute 
Zhonghua minzu.137 
However, just as scholars are beginning to consider hanjian and their historical and 
national context in more depth, the term’s popular usage has exploded. The combination of 
fervent nationalism and readily available Web access means that anyone can launch a diatribe 
against the hanjian of his or her choice, and many do. The frequency of these accusations has led 
one blogger to assert that the term “covers all the descendents of the Yan and Yellow Emperors” 
(覆盖所有炎黄子孙, fugai suoyou Yan Huang zisun), i.e., that every Chinese is a hanjian.138 
While these popular outbursts generally serve to reinforce the CCP’s stance on various national 
issues, like the harsher strands of contemporary Chinese nationalism in general, in its extremity 
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this new phenomenon also threatens the ideological foundations of the People’s Republic’s 
nationality policies. 
Accusations of hanjianism are common to discussions of China’s relationship with Japan, 
reflecting that country’s continued antagonistic role in Chinese foreign policy and nationalist 
sentiment. Chinese who support the Japanese government or express excessive admiration for 
Japanese culture are routinely labeled hanjian.139 In 2002, People’s Daily writer Ma Licheng 
published an article criticizing the more rabid attributes of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, 
including the description of Chinese Japanophiles as hanjian and the regular use of anti-Japanese 
slurs. His article sparked a public outcry, and Ma himself was depicted as a hanjian who 
encouraged the return of the “Japanese devils” (日本鬼子 Riben guizi).140 In more extreme cases, 
the term hanjian is extended to Chinese whose support for Japan is vague, tangential, or merely 
implied by the accuser, such as when Zhang Ziyi took the lead role in the 2005 film Memoirs of 
a Geisha and was immediately declared a hanjian by thousands of Chinese netizens.141 
Perhaps the area where hanjian fever is most amenable to the CCP’s desires is the issue 
of Taiwan. Unlike the Nationalist government, during and immediately after the Second Sino-
Japanese War the Communists never described Taiwanese in the service of Japan as hanjian.142 
However, the establishment of the Republic of China government-in-exile under Chiang Kai-
shek, himself already condemned as a hanjian for his conciliatory stance toward Japan, has led to 
a retrospective shift in outlook. The ROC’s pro-Western and anti-revolutionary stance, combined 
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with Taiwan’s continuing presence as the most significant piece of Chinese irredenta,143 have led 
advocates of Taiwanese independence to continue to be labeled as hanjian by the mainland. 
One of the most notable instances of this occurred during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
of 1995-1996. As early as 1994, Guomindang President Lee Teng-hui had begun to indicate his 
desire for a closer relationship with the United States and a peaceful independence settlement 
with the mainland. He hoped these appeals would broaden his appeal to the Taiwanese center in 
preparation for the 1996 presidential elections, in which the GMD would face the pro-
independence Democratic People’s Party. In June 1995 he secured a visa from the United States 
government to speak at his alma mater, Cornell University, becoming the first major Taiwanese 
leader to visit America since US-PRC relations were normalized in 1979.144 China’s reaction was 
furious and swift. Beijing issued a statement condemning Lee’s behavior and describing then-his 
father, who had served as an officer of the Japanese colonial police, as a hanjian.145 The People’s 
Republic backed this rhetoric by withdrawing its ambassador from Washington and test-firing 
missiles into the Taiwan Strait, launches which were resumed in the run-up to the Taiwanese 
election the following year.146 
Although the incident was ultimately resolved peacefully, Lee himself has come under 
further attack because of his involvement in the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union. He 
tops one blogger’s list of “Contemporary China’s Ten Famous Hanjian,”147 while a Baidu search 
for Lee’s name and the term hanjian garners 416,000 results, with titles such as “Kill the 
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Hanjian Lee Teng-Hui!” (杀死李登辉汉奸, Shasi Li Denghui hanjian), “The Ugly Face of the 
Great Hanjian Lee Teng-Hui” (大汉奸李登辉的丑恶嘴脸 Da hanjian Li Denghui de chou’e 
zuilian), and “Lee Teng-Hui, This Garbage Traitor!” (李登辉这个垃圾汉奸 Lee Denghui zhege 
laji hanjian).148 This mass opprobrium for Lee, as well as other advocates of Taiwanese 
independence like novelist Shu Chin-chiang,149 serves to reinforce the One China Policy and the 
CCP’s commitment to reunification. According to this view, Taiwan is a limb of the Chinese 
national body, and anyone who attempts to amputate it (particularly giving the enduring 
American commitment to the island) is immediately denounced as a traitor.150 
However, large-scale expressions of dissatisfaction against hanjian are not always in 
harmony with the CCP’s interests. In 2008, the prominent historian Yan Chongnian published 
The Kangxi Emperor (康熙大帝, Kangxi dadi), a history of the longest-reigned and arguably 
greatest emperor of the Qing dynasty detailing his many accomplishments and placing relatively 
little weight on the violence inflicted against Han Chinese during the consolidation of his rule. At 
a book signing in Wuxi, Yan was approached by Huang Haiqing, a clothing entrepreneur, who 
called Yan “hanjian” and slapped him twice in the face.151 Although Huang was promptly 
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arrested, he received immediate support from internet commenters and other bloggers on the Han 
supremacist site Hanwang, who encouraged him to “Beat him good that old dog!” and remarked 
that “It should come as no surprise that a Han traitor who has forgotten his origins should be 
beaten.”152 Huang’s denunciation of Yan—exacerbated by his physical assault on an elder (Yan 
was 74 at the time)—sprung from belief in a Han-centered ethnic nation in direct conflict with 
the official policy of one Zhonghua minzu comprising fifty-six nationalities. 
Throughout the PRC’s sixty-two year history, then, hanjian has continued to be a central 
part of the Chinese political discourse. Whether applied to national traitors or to ideological foes, 
it has isolated its users’ targets for public disdain. And whether used in harmony with or 
resistance to the Communist Party’s official stance, it has played a key role in shaping the 
identity of the Chinese nation as it continues to evolve to this day. 
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Conclusion 
 
Over the past century and a half, China has faced constant and drastic changes that have 
shaken to the core every aspect of Chinese society and prompted questions about the very nature 
of China itself. From the “century of humiliation” through three decades of socialism and on to 
the twenty-first century, the Chinese nation has been defined in a number of ways by different 
groups whose common goal of a stronger China has been tinted by the individual lenses of their 
own ideology and worldview. While hanjian has itself been refracted by each of these prisms, it 
has nevertheless been an important and enduring part of these national projects. 
Under the Qing, the term hanjian served to reinforce imperial authority and divide those 
Han who rebelled against the Manchu court from the mass of their peers, whether they allied 
with Ming remnants, minority insurrections, or invading Western powers. As faith in the Qing 
dynasty—and the imperial system as a whole—began to collapse around the turn of the twentieth 
century, the meaning of hanjian shifted to reflect Sun Yat-sen and other anti-Qing 
revolutionaries’ new definition of China as a modern nation consisting solely of the Han ethnic 
group. The Nationalist government established by Sun’s successor Chiang Kai-shek continued to 
promote this ethnic-national vision under the broader banner of Zhonghua minzu. 
After the Japanese invasion, the GMD promoted resistance as the true expression of 
national loyalty, condemning collaborators like Wang Jingwei to reject their justifications of 
cooperation for national survival, while the Communist resistance denounced Chiang himself 
because of his appeasement of Japan. The CCP’s revolutionary nationalism further extended the 
term to class and ideological enemies, while the reinterpretation of Chinese history according to 
Marxist theory by Chinese intellectuals like Fan Wenlan retroactively applied the term to 
historical “reactionaries.” The Party’s recent movement away from the socialist principles at the 
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heart of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought has inspired a new generation of Chinese 
scholars to reexamine the categories of hanjian inherited from Maoist historiography. At the 
same time, the combination of cresting nationalist sentiment and novel means of mass 
communication has led to a simultaneous explosion and banalization of its use in present-day 
China.153 
As this last conflict indicates, even as scholars begin trying to pin it down, the term’s 
continuing evolution in contemporary Chinese discourse, its diverse and often contradictory 
history, and the heated emotions that spark its use make hanjian a moving target. However, even 
as it wriggles between the analytical tweezers, we can still study the contortions of this 
verminous word. Throughout the period of this study, hanjian has had political, ethnic, and 
national implications, and its use has significant repercussions for each of these areas. 
Throughout the past two centuries, hanjian has been used as a political tool by imperial 
officials, Nationalists, and Communists alike. While the term’s diversity reveals the protean 
nature of national sentiment in China, the use of hanjian for political ends also reflects its users’ 
politicization of “the state-supporting loyalty,” nationalism.154 All nationalism, whether ethnic or 
otherwise, is political in nature, and Chinese nationalism is no exception. Its birth was midwived 
by the political question of whether to support or oppose the Qing regime, and both nationalism 
as a whole and the term hanjian in particular have played a major role in the political struggles 
that have raged in China throughout the twentieth century. However, hanjian is ultimately 
poisonous to political discourse. Using the term asserts an exclusive interpretation of Chinese 
nationhood that denies the possibility of competing perspectives. Even when both sides invoke 
the term against each other, as in the case of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, each political 
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discourse is nevertheless unilateral, a clash between two mutually exclusive visions with no 
space left—or desired—for common ground. Furthermore, the offhand rejection of “traitor logic” 
(汉奸理论 hanjian lilun) robs those accused of hanjianism of the possibility of engaging in 
debate, while the word’s potent nationalist charge makes it a natural tool of extremism. 
Despite the word’s etymology, after the establishment of the Republic of China hanjian 
lost much of its ethnic charge, describing traitors to the nation as a whole with no specific 
reference to the Han ethnicity. Nevertheless, “Han” remains an integral part of the word’s literal, 
if not its common, definition. This lasting ethnic dimension can be specifically invoked, as seen 
in the case of Taiwanese collaborators and during the Yan Chongnian incident, and presents a 
major challenge to the official ethnic narrative endorsed by the CCP. Just as scholarly 
reassessments of Qing officials have abandoned the hanjian label because it “runs counter to the 
interest of the whole nation by dividing the Han and the Manchu peoples,”155 the Han 
supremacist interpretation of Huang Haiqing and his fellow Hanwang posters proves antithetical 
to the official narrative of a harmoniously multiethnic society. 
Finally, hanjian as a group have a unique relationship to the national community. As 
stated above, using the term presents an interpretation of the Chinese nation, but it also identifies 
an external enemy and places the word’s referent, i.e. the accused, between these two areas. 
Hanjian are rejected from the national body, but they cannot be expelled completely, as one must 
be part of the Chinese nation, however it is defined, in order to qualify as hanjian. In this regard, 
the word is ironically inclusive. Figures like the Dalai Lama or Yoshiko Kawashima, the Manchu 
princess, Japanese by adoption and upbringing, who was executed as hanjian for her role as a 
Japanese agent during the war, may not self-identify as Chinese. Nevertheless, they have 
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Chineseness thrust upon them through accusations that they are (or were) hanjian. Hanjian, then, 
serves as a linguistic performative: calling someone “hanjian” brings—or drags—them into the 
Chinese nation. However, hanjian are not full-fledged nationals; instead, they live within the line 
that is drawn between Chinese and outsider, friend and enemy, between “one’s own country” and 
“a foreign race or a foreign invader.” In doing so, they add another layer between self and other, 
the “us” and “them” through whose opposition scholars consider national identity to be formed. 
As intermediary figures, hanjian undermine this dichotomy, forcing us to reconsider how we 
decide who is Chinese, who is not, and who is in between. 
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